Politician

‍A sophisticated WiFi auditing library for ESP32 microcontrollers

Politician is an embedded C++ library designed for WiFi security auditing on ESP32 platforms. It provides a clean, modern API for capturing WPA/WPA2/WPA3 handshakes and harvesting enterprise credentials using advanced 802.11 protocol techniques.

Key Capabilities

• PMKID Capture: Extract PMKIDs from association responses without client disconnection
• CSA (Channel Switch Announcement) Injection: Modern alternative to deauthentication attacks
• Enterprise Credential Harvesting: Capture EAP-Identity frames from 802.1X networks
  
• Hidden Network Discovery: Automatic SSID decloaking via probe response interception
• Device Fingerprinting: Passively identify 150+ consumer IoT/smart home brands via MAC OUI and IE signatures without network association
• Client Stimulation: Wake sleeping mobile devices using QoS Null Data frames
• WPA3/PMF Detection: Intelligent filtering to skip Protected Management Frame-enabled networks
• Export Formats: PCAPNG capture files; optional HC22000 text export for direct Hashcat ingestion

Architecture

The library is built around a non-blocking state machine that manages channel hopping, target selection, attack execution, and capture processing. All operations are contained within the politician namespace.

Core Components

Component	Description
Politician	Main engine class managing the audit lifecycle
PoliticianFormat	PCAPNG capture serialization; auxiliary HC22000 text export
PoliticianStorage	Optional SD card logging and NVS persistence
PoliticianStress	Decoupled DoS/disruption payload delivery (opt-in)
PoliticianTypes	Core data structures and enumerations

Attack Modes

Traditional deauthentication attacks are ineffective against modern WPA3 and WPA2 networks with Protected Management Frames (PMF/802.11w). Politician implements modern alternatives:

Mode	Description	Effectiveness
ATTACK_PMKID	Extract PMKID via dummy authentication	Works on all WPA2/WPA3-Transition
ATTACK_CSA	Channel Switch Announcement injection	Bypasses PMF protections
ATTACK_DEAUTH	Legacy deauthentication (Reason 7)	WPA2 without PMF only
ATTACK_STIMULATE	QoS Null Data for sleeping clients	Non-intrusive client wake-up
ATTACK_PASSIVE	Listen-only mode	Zero transmission
ATTACK_ALL	Enable all active attack vectors	Maximum aggression

Installation

PlatformIO

Add to your platformio.ini:

[env:myboard]
platform = espressif32
board = esp32dev
framework = arduino
lib_deps = 
    Politician

Or clone directly into your project's lib/ directory:

cd lib/
git clone https://github.com/0ldev/Politician.git

Arduino IDE

1. Download the library as a ZIP file
2. In Arduino IDE: Sketch → Include Library → Add .ZIP Library
3. Select the downloaded ZIP file

ESP-IDF

Clone the repository into your project's components/ directory:

cd components/
git clone https://github.com/0ldev/Politician.git

Create a components/Politician/CMakeLists.txt component descriptor:

idf_component_register(
    SRCS
        "src/Politician.cpp"
        "src/PoliticianFormat.cpp"
        "src/PoliticianStress.cpp"
    INCLUDE_DIRS "src"
)

PoliticianStorage.h is not available under ESP-IDF — it emits a #error at compile time if included outside Arduino. Use ESP-IDF's VFS and nvs_flash APIs directly for any persistence you need.

Quick Start

Basic Handshake Capture

#include <Arduino.h>
#include <SD.h>
#include <Politician.h>
#include <PoliticianStorage.h>
 
using namespace politician;
using namespace politician::storage;
 
Politician engine;
 
void onHandshake(const HandshakeRecord &rec) {
    Serial.printf("\n[✓] Captured: %s  ch%d  rssi=%d  type=%d\n",
                  rec.ssid, rec.channel, rec.rssi, rec.type);
    // Primary output: PCAPNG — open in Wireshark or convert with hcxpcapngtool
    PcapngFileLogger::append(SD, "/captures.pcapng", rec);
}
 
void setup() {
    Serial.begin(115200);
    SD.begin();
 
    engine.setEapolCallback(onHandshake);
 
    Config cfg;
    engine.begin(cfg);
    engine.setAttackMask(ATTACK_ALL);
}
 
void loop() {
    engine.tick();
}

Bare ESP-IDF Quick Start

Under ESP-IDF, begin() calls esp_wifi_init() internally but expects NVS and the default event loop to already be initialized. Call those before begin(), then drive the engine from a FreeRTOS task.

#include <nvs_flash.h>
#include <esp_event.h>
#include <freertos/FreeRTOS.h>
#include <freertos/task.h>
#include <Politician.h>
 
using namespace politician;
 
static Politician engine;
 
static void on_handshake(const HandshakeRecord &rec) {
    printf("[+] Captured: %s  ch%d  rssi=%d  type=%d\n",
           rec.ssid, rec.channel, rec.rssi, rec.type);
}
 
static void audit_task(void *) {
    Config cfg;
    engine.setEapolCallback(on_handshake);
 
    if (engine.begin(cfg) != OK) {
        printf("[!] WiFi init failed\n");
        vTaskDelete(nullptr);
        return;
    }
 
    engine.setAttackMask(ATTACK_ALL);
 
    for (;;) {
        engine.tick();
        vTaskDelay(pdMS_TO_TICKS(1));
    }
}
 
extern "C" void app_main(void) {
    nvs_flash_init();
    esp_event_loop_create_default();
 
    xTaskCreate(audit_task, "politician", 8192, nullptr, 5, nullptr);
}

API Reference

Politician Class

The main engine class. Must call tick() in your main loop.

Initialization

Error begin(const Config& cfg = Config());

Initialize the engine. Returns OK on success or an Error code on failure. Must be called before any other method.

Configuration Structure

struct Config {
    uint16_t hop_dwell_ms           = 200;   // Static time spent on each channel (ms)
    bool     smart_hopping          = true;  // Dynamic channel dwell time based on traffic
    uint16_t hop_min_dwell_ms       = 50;    // Minimum dwell if no traffic is seen
    uint16_t hop_max_dwell_ms       = 400;   // Maximum dwell if traffic is active
    uint32_t m1_lock_ms             = 800;   // How long to stay on channel after seeing M1
    uint32_t fish_timeout_ms        = 2000;  // Timeout per PMKID association attempt
    uint8_t  fish_max_retries       = 2;     // PMKID retries before pivoting to CSA
    uint32_t csa_wait_ms            = 4000;  // Wait window after CSA/Deauth burst
    uint8_t  csa_beacon_count       = 8;     // Number of CSA beacons per burst
    uint8_t  deauth_burst_count     = 16;    // Frames per standalone deauth burst
    uint8_t  csa_deauth_count       = 15;    // Deauth frames appended after CSA burst
    uint16_t probe_aggr_interval_s  = 30;    // Seconds between re-attacking the same AP
    uint32_t session_timeout_ms     = 60000; // How long orphaned sessions live in RAM
    bool     capture_half_handshakes = false; // Fire callback on M2-only captures and pivot to active attack
    bool     skip_immune_networks   = true;  // Skip pure WPA3 / PMF-Required networks
    uint8_t  capture_filter         = LOG_FILTER_HANDSHAKES | LOG_FILTER_PROBES;
    int8_t   min_rssi               = -100;  // Ignore APs weaker than this signal (dBm)
    uint32_t ap_expiry_ms           = 300000; // Evict APs not seen for this long (0 = never expire)
    bool     unicast_deauth         = true;  // Send deauth to known client MAC instead of broadcast
    uint32_t probe_hidden_interval_ms = 0;   // How often to probe hidden APs for SSID (0 = disabled, opt-in)
    uint8_t  deauth_reason          = 7;     // 802.11 reason code in deauth frames
    bool     deauth_reason_cycling  = true;  // Cycle through effective reason codes (fuzzing)
    // ── Frame capture
    bool     capture_group_keys     = false; // Fire eapolCb(CAP_EAPOL_GROUP) on GTK rotation frames
    // ── Filtering
    uint8_t  min_beacon_count       = 0;     // Min times AP must be seen before attack/apFoundCb (0 = off)
    uint8_t  max_total_attempts     = 0;     // Permanently skip BSSID after N failed attacks (0 = unlimited)
    uint8_t  sta_filter[6]          = {};    // Only record EAPOL from this client MAC (zero = no filter)
    char     ssid_filter[33]        = {};    // Only cache APs matching this SSID (empty = no filter)
    bool     ssid_filter_exact      = true;  // True = exact match, false = substring match
    uint8_t  enc_filter_mask        = 0xFF;  // Bitmask of enc types to cache
    bool     require_active_clients = false; // Skip attack initiation if no active clients seen on AP
};

Advanced Features

Autonomous Hunter (Fingerprint-Aware Targeting)

Prioritize specific device vendors during autoTarget using the built-in OUI database:

// 1. Define your targeting policy
int hunterScore(const ApRecord &ap, const char *vendor) {
    int score = ap.rssi; // Start with signal strength
    
    // Prioritize high-value targets
    if (strstr(vendor, "Apple"))   score += 50;
    if (strstr(vendor, "Hikvision")) score += 80; // Security Cameras
    
    // Ignore uninteresting noise
    if (ap.flags.is_hidden) score -= 100;
    
    return score;
}
 
void setup() {
    engine.begin();
    engine.setTargetScoreCallback(hunterScore);
    engine.setAutoTarget(true);
    engine.startHopping();
}

Custom Frame Injection & Fuzzing

Inject arbitrary 802.11 frames with precise channel control:

// Malformed Probe Request for fuzzing
uint8_t malformedFrame[] = { 0x40, 0x00, ... };
 
void loop() {
    engine.tick();
    
    // Inject immediately on channel 6, locking the hopper for 100ms
    engine.injectCustomFrame(malformedFrame, sizeof(malformedFrame), 6, 100);
    
    // Queue for stealthy injection (fires only when hopper lands on ch 11)
    engine.injectCustomFrame(malformedFrame, sizeof(malformedFrame), 11, 0, true);
}

Disconnection Strategy

Optimize stealth by chaining attack methods sequentially:

void setup() {
    Config cfg;
    engine.begin(cfg);
    
    // Attempt CSA (Stealthy) first, fallback to Deauth only if needed
    engine.setDisconnectionStrategy(STRATEGY_AUTO_FALLBACK);
    
    engine.setAttackMask(ATTACK_CSA | ATTACK_DEAUTH);
}

802.11u Interworking Discovery

Discover the physical venue context of public networks:

void onAp(const ApRecord &ap) {
    if (ap.venue_group != 0) {
        Serial.printf("Venue: Group %d, Type %d\n", ap.venue_group, ap.venue_type);
        // e.g., Group 2 (Education), Type 8 (University)
    }
}

Callbacks

void setEapolCallback(EapolCb cb);              // Handshake captured (EAPOL, PMKID, or group key)
void setApFoundCallback(ApFoundCb cb);          // New AP discovered (respects min_beacon_count)
void setIdentityCallback(IdentityCb cb);        // 802.1X EAP-Identity harvested
void setAttackResultCallback(AttackResultCb cb);// Attack exhausted without capturing
void setTargetFilter(TargetFilterCb cb);        // Early filter — return false to ignore AP
void setPacketLogger(PacketCb cb);              // Raw promiscuous-mode frames
void setProbeRequestCallback(ProbeRequestCb cb);// Probe request received (client device history)
void setDisruptCallback(DisruptCb cb);          // Deauth/Disassoc frame received
void setClientFoundCallback(ClientFoundCb cb);  // New client STA seen associated to an AP
void setRogueApCallback(RogueApCb cb);          // Second BSSID with same SSID on same channel (evil twin)

State & Stats

bool    isActive()    const;  // True if frame processing is enabled
bool    isAttacking() const;  // True if a PMKID/CSA attack is in progress
bool    hasTarget()   const;  // True if focused on a specific BSSID
uint8_t getChannel()  const;  // Current radio channel
int8_t  getLastRssi() const;  // RSSI of the last received frame
Stats&  getStats();           // Reference to frame counters (captures, failures, etc.)
Config& getConfig();          // Reference to the active config for runtime mutations
void    resetStats();         // Zero all counters
int     getApCount() const;   // Number of APs in the discovery cache
bool    getAp(int idx, ApRecord &out) const;                  // Read AP from cache by index
bool    getApByBssid(const uint8_t* bssid, ApRecord &out) const; // Look up AP by BSSID
int     getClientCount(const uint8_t* bssid) const;           // Number of clients seen on AP (0-4)
bool    getClient(const uint8_t* bssid, int idx, uint8_t out_sta[6]) const; // Read client MAC by index

Engine Control

void setActive(bool active);  // Enable or disable frame processing without full teardown
void setLogger(LogCb cb);     // Redirect internal log output to a custom callback

Target & Channel Control

Error setTarget(const uint8_t* bssid, uint8_t channel); // Focus on one BSSID
void  clearTarget();                                     // Resume autonomous operation
Error setChannel(uint8_t ch);                            // Tune to a specific channel
Error lockChannel(uint8_t ch);                           // Stop hopping, lock channel
void  startHopping(uint16_t dwellMs = 0);                // Start channel hopping
void  stopHopping();                                     // Stop hopping (attack state machine continues)
void  stop();                                            // Full teardown: abort attack, clear target, stop hopping, disable capture
void  setChannelList(const uint8_t* channels, uint8_t count); // Restrict hop sequence
void  setChannelBands(bool ghz24, bool ghz5);                // Hop 2.4GHz, 5GHz, or both
Error setTargetBySsid(const char* ssid);                     // Lock target by SSID (picks strongest match from cache)
void  setAutoTarget(bool enable);                            // Continuously auto-target strongest uncaptured AP

Captured List

void markCaptured(const uint8_t* bssid);                       // Skip this BSSID forever
void clearCapturedList();                                       // Reset captured list
void setIgnoreList(const uint8_t (*bssids)[6], uint8_t count); // Permanent ignore list

Attack Control

void setAttackMask(uint8_t mask);                                // Configure active attack vectors (bitmask)
void setAttackMaskForBssid(const uint8_t* bssid, uint8_t mask); // Per-BSSID override (up to 8 entries)
void clearAttackMaskOverrides();                                  // Remove all per-BSSID overrides

Attack Mode Constants

#define ATTACK_PMKID        0x01  // PMKID fishing via fake association
#define ATTACK_CSA          0x02  // Channel Switch Announcement injection
#define ATTACK_PASSIVE      0x04  // Listen-only — zero transmission
#define ATTACK_DEAUTH       0x08  // Classic deauthentication (Reason 7)
#define ATTACK_STIMULATE    0x10  // QoS Null Data client stimulation
#define ATTACK_ALL          0x1F  // All attack vectors

Capture Type Constants

#define CAP_PMKID        0x01  // PMKID extracted via fake association
#define CAP_EAPOL        0x02  // Full M1+M2 from passive capture
#define CAP_EAPOL_CSA    0x03  // Full M1+M2 triggered by CSA/Deauth
#define CAP_EAPOL_HALF   0x04  // M2-only (no anonce) — active attack pivot fired
#define CAP_EAPOL_GROUP  0x05  // Non-pairwise EAPOL-Key (GTK rotation)

Capture Filter Constants

#define LOG_FILTER_HANDSHAKES   0x01  // EAPOLs and PMKIDs (SPI-safe)
#define LOG_FILTER_PROBES       0x02  // Probe requests and responses (SPI-safe)
#define LOG_FILTER_BEACONS      0x04  // Beacons — high volume, SDMMC only
#define LOG_FILTER_PROBE_REQ    0x08  // Probe requests as raw EPBs (SPI-safe)
#define LOG_FILTER_MGMT_DISRUPT 0x10  // Deauth/Disassoc frames as raw EPBs (SPI-safe)
#define LOG_FILTER_ALL          0xFF  // Everything — SDMMC only

Data Structures

Stats

struct Stats {
    uint32_t total;              // Total frames received
    uint32_t mgmt;               // Management frames
    uint32_t ctrl;               // Control frames
    uint32_t data;               // Data frames
    uint32_t eapol;              // EAPOL frames detected
    uint32_t pmkid_found;        // PMKIDs captured
    uint32_t beacons;            // Beacon and probe-response frames
    uint32_t captures;           // Total successful captures
    uint32_t failed_pmkid;       // PMKID attempts exhausted without capture
    uint32_t failed_csa;         // CSA/Deauth windows expired without EAPOL
    uint16_t channel_frames[14]; // Frames per 2.4GHz channel (index 0 = ch1 … index 13 = ch14)
};

HandshakeRecord

struct HandshakeRecord {
    uint8_t  type;           // CAP_PMKID / CAP_EAPOL / CAP_EAPOL_CSA / CAP_EAPOL_HALF / CAP_EAPOL_GROUP
    uint8_t  channel;
    int8_t   rssi;
    uint8_t  bssid[6];
    uint8_t  sta[6];         // Client (station) MAC
    char     ssid[33];
    uint8_t  ssid_len;
    uint8_t  enc;            // 0=Open, 1=WEP, 2=WPA, 3=WPA2/WPA3, 4=Enterprise
    // PMKID path
    uint8_t  pmkid[16];
    // EAPOL path
    uint8_t  anonce[32];
    uint8_t  mic[16];
    uint8_t  eapol_m2[256];
    uint16_t eapol_m2_len;
    bool     has_mic;
    bool     has_anonce;
};

EapIdentityRecord

struct EapIdentityRecord {
    uint8_t bssid[6];       // Access Point MAC
    uint8_t client[6];      // Enterprise client MAC
    char    identity[65];   // Plaintext identity / email
    uint8_t channel;
    int8_t  rssi;
};

ApRecord

struct ApRecord {
    uint8_t bssid[6];
    char    ssid[33];
    uint8_t ssid_len;
    uint8_t channel;
    int8_t  rssi;
    uint8_t enc;           // 0=Open, 1=WEP, 2=WPA, 3=WPA2/WPA3, 4=Enterprise
    bool    wps_enabled;   // WPS IE detected in beacon/probe-response
    bool    pmf_capable;     // MFPC — AP supports Protected Management Frames
    bool    pmf_required;    // MFPR — AP mandates PMF (pure WPA3 / PMF-Required)
    uint8_t total_attempts;  // Failed attack attempts against this BSSID
    bool    captured;        // True if BSSID is on the captured or ignore list
    bool     ft_capable;      // 802.11r FT AKM advertised (FT-PSK suite 4 or FT-EAP suite 3)
    uint32_t first_seen_ms;   // millis() timestamp when this AP was first observed
    uint32_t last_seen_ms;    // millis() timestamp of the most recent beacon or probe response
    char     country[3];      // ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code from IE 7 (e.g. "US"), empty if absent
    uint16_t beacon_interval; // Advertised beacon interval in TUs (1 TU = 1024 µs), 0 if unknown
    uint8_t  max_rate_mbps;   // Highest legacy data rate from Supported Rates IE (Mbps), 0 if unknown
};

AttackResultRecord

enum AttackResult : uint8_t {
    RESULT_PMKID_EXHAUSTED = 1,  // All PMKID retries failed
    RESULT_CSA_EXPIRED     = 2,  // CSA/Deauth window closed, no EAPOL received
};
 
struct AttackResultRecord {
    uint8_t      bssid[6];
    char         ssid[33];
    uint8_t      ssid_len;
    AttackResult result;
};

RogueApRecord

struct RogueApRecord {
    uint8_t known_bssid[6]; // BSSID of the first AP already cached with this SSID
    uint8_t rogue_bssid[6]; // BSSID of the newly observed AP sharing the same SSID
    char    ssid[33];       // The shared SSID
    uint8_t ssid_len;
    uint8_t channel;        // Channel on which the conflict was detected
    int8_t  rssi;           // Signal strength of the rogue AP (dBm)
};

ProbeRequestRecord

struct ProbeRequestRecord {
    uint8_t client[6];   // Probing device MAC
    uint8_t channel;
    int8_t  rssi;
    char    ssid[33];    // Requested SSID (empty = wildcard probe)
    uint8_t ssid_len;
    bool    rand_mac;    // True if locally administered bit set (iOS/Android MAC randomization)
};

DisruptRecord

struct DisruptRecord {
    uint8_t  src[6];     // Frame source MAC
    uint8_t  dst[6];     // Frame destination MAC
    uint8_t  bssid[6];   // BSSID (addr3)
    uint16_t reason;     // 802.11 reason code
    uint8_t  subtype;    // MGMT_SUB_DEAUTH (0xC0) or MGMT_SUB_DISASSOC (0xA0)
    uint8_t  channel;
    int8_t   rssi;
    bool     rand_mac;   // True if source MAC has locally administered bit set (randomized)
};

Format Utilities

PCAPNG is the primary capture format — it is tool-agnostic, preserves full frame context, and can be opened in Wireshark or piped through hcxpcapngtool. HC22000 is an auxiliary text export for users who want to feed captures directly into hashcat without an intermediate conversion step.

// Convert a HandshakeRecord to an HC22000 string (auxiliary — use PCAPNG as the primary output)
String toHC22000(const HandshakeRecord& rec);
 
// Write PCAPNG global header (SHB + IDB) — call once at file start
size_t writePcapngGlobalHeader(uint8_t* buffer);
 
// Serialize a HandshakeRecord into PCAPNG Enhanced Packet Blocks
size_t writePcapngRecord(const HandshakeRecord& rec, uint8_t* buffer, size_t max_len);
 
// Serialize a raw 802.11 frame into a PCAPNG Enhanced Packet Block
size_t writePcapngPacket(const uint8_t* payload, size_t len,
                        int8_t rssi, uint8_t channel, uint64_t ts_usec, 
                        uint8_t* buffer, size_t max_len);

Stress Utilities (Opt-in)

Requires #include <PoliticianStress.h>. Not linked unless explicitly included.

// Flood a WPA3 AP with SAE Commit frames to exhaust its anti-clogging token heap
stress::saeCommitFlood(const uint8_t* bssid, uint32_t count = 1000);
 
// Flood nearby APs with randomized Probe Requests to saturate association queues
stress::probeRequestFlood(uint32_t count = 1000);

Storage Utilities (Optional)

Requires #include <PoliticianStorage.h>.

// Append handshake to PCAPNG file (writes global header automatically)
PcapngFileLogger::append(fs::FS& fs, const char* path,
                         const HandshakeRecord& rec);
 
// Append raw 802.11 frame to PCAPNG file
PcapngFileLogger::appendPacket(fs::FS& fs, const char* path,
                               const uint8_t* payload, uint16_t len,
                               int8_t rssi, uint32_t ts_usec);
 
// Append handshake details to Wigle CSV
WigleCsvLogger::append(fs::FS& fs, const char* path,
                       const HandshakeRecord& rec, float lat, float lon,
                       float alt = 0.0, float acc = 10.0,
                       const char* timestamp = nullptr);  // e.g. "2024-06-01 14:30:00"
 
// Append any discovered AP to Wigle CSV (use with setApFoundCallback)
WigleCsvLogger::appendAp(fs::FS& fs, const char* path,
                         const ApRecord& ap, float lat, float lon,
                         float alt = 0.0, float acc = 10.0,
                         const char* timestamp = nullptr);
 
// Append handshake to HC22000 text file
Hc22000FileLogger::append(fs::FS& fs, const char* path,
                           const HandshakeRecord& rec);
 
// Append harvested enterprise identity to CSV
EnterpriseCsvLogger::append(fs::FS& fs, const char* path,
                            const EapIdentityRecord& rec);

Usage Examples

Targeted Network Auditing

Use callbacks to filter networks by signal strength, encryption type, or SSID pattern:

engine.setTargetFilter([](const politician::ApRecord &ap) {
    // Only audit strong signals
    if (ap.rssi < -70) return false;
    
    // Skip Open/WEP networks
    if (ap.enc < 3) return false;
    
    // Skip corporate networks  
    if (strstr(ap.ssid, "CORP-") != nullptr) return false;
    
    return true;
});

Selective Attack Modes

// Modern CSA-only (bypasses PMF)
engine.setAttackMask(ATTACK_CSA);
 
// Classic deauth for legacy networks
engine.setAttackMask(ATTACK_DEAUTH);
 
// Passive monitoring with client stimulation
engine.setAttackMask(ATTACK_PASSIVE | ATTACK_STIMULATE);
 
// Full aggression
engine.setAttackMask(ATTACK_ALL);

Enterprise Credential Harvesting

void onIdentity(const EapIdentityRecord &rec) {
    char bssid[18];
    snprintf(bssid, sizeof(bssid), "%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X",
             rec.bssid[0], rec.bssid[1], rec.bssid[2],
             rec.bssid[3], rec.bssid[4], rec.bssid[5]);
    Serial.printf("[802.1X] %s → %s\n", bssid, rec.identity);
    EnterpriseCsvLogger::append(SD, "/identities.csv", rec);
}
 
void setup() {
    engine.setIdentityCallback(onIdentity);
 
    Config cfg;
    cfg.hop_dwell_ms = 800;  // Longer dwell for EAP exchanges
    engine.begin(cfg);
}

Persistent Storage

The core library is decoupled from filesystem dependencies. Optionally include PoliticianStorage.h for SD card logging:

#include <PoliticianStorage.h>
#include <SD.h>
 
using namespace politician::storage;
 
void onHandshake(const HandshakeRecord &rec) {
    // Append to PCAPNG file (creates headers automatically)
    PcapngFileLogger::append(SD, "/captures.pcapng", rec);
}
 
void onPacket(const uint8_t* payload, uint16_t len, int8_t rssi, uint8_t channel, uint32_t ts) {
    // Log raw 802.11 frames
    PcapngFileLogger::appendPacket(SD, "/intel.pcapng", payload, len, rssi, channel, ts);
}
 
void setup() {
    SD.begin();
    engine.setEapolCallback(onHandshake);
    engine.setPacketLogger(onPacket);
    
    Config cfg;
    cfg.capture_filter = LOG_FILTER_HANDSHAKES | LOG_FILTER_PROBES;
    engine.begin(cfg);
}

⚠️ Logging Performance Warning

Beacon logging (LOG_FILTER_BEACONS) can generate 500+ writes/second. Standard SPI SD card writes are blocking and will freeze the engine. For high-volume logging, use ESP32 boards with native SDMMC (4-bit) hardware support and DMA.

GPS Integration (Wigle.net)

Combine with a GPS module for wardriving datasets:

#include <TinyGPS++.h>
 
TinyGPSPlus gps;
 
// Log every discovered AP (use appendAp for ApRecord)
void onAp(const ApRecord &ap) {
    if (gps.location.isValid()) {
        WigleCsvLogger::appendAp(SD, "/wardrive.csv", ap,
                                 gps.location.lat(),
                                 gps.location.lng());
    }
}
 
// Log captured handshakes with GPS context (use append for HandshakeRecord)
void onHandshake(const HandshakeRecord &rec) {
    if (gps.location.isValid()) {
        WigleCsvLogger::append(SD, "/wardrive.csv", rec,
                               gps.location.lat(),
                               gps.location.lng());
    }
}

Advanced Features

Half-Handshakes and Smart Pivot

When cfg.capture_half_handshakes = true, the engine fires the EAPOL callback with type = CAP_EAPOL_HALF on M2-only captures. These records have no anonce so they cannot be directly cracked, but they confirm an active client is present.

The engine immediately executes a Smart Pivot:

1. Marks the network as having active clients
2. Launches CSA/Deauth to force a fresh 4-way handshake
3. Captures the complete M1+M2 on reconnection

Attack Result Callbacks

Register setAttackResultCallback() to be notified when an attack exhausts all options without capturing anything. Useful for logging failed targets or adjusting strategy at runtime:

engine.setAttackResultCallback([](const AttackResultRecord &res) {
    char bssid[18];
    snprintf(bssid, sizeof(bssid), "%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X",
             res.bssid[0], res.bssid[1], res.bssid[2],
             res.bssid[3], res.bssid[4], res.bssid[5]);
    if (res.result == RESULT_PMKID_EXHAUSTED)
        Serial.printf("[!] PMKID failed: %s (%s)\n", res.ssid, bssid);
    else if (res.result == RESULT_CSA_EXPIRED)
        Serial.printf("[!] CSA/Deauth timed out: %s (%s)\n", res.ssid, bssid);
});

802.11r Fast Transition Detection

The engine detects 802.11r Fast Transition AKMs (FT-PSK suite type 4, FT-EAP suite type 3) in beacon and probe-response RSN IEs. When detected, ApRecord.ft_capable is set to true and a log note is emitted during PMKID fishing.

For FT Transition Mode APs (advertising both FT-PSK and regular WPA2-PSK), standard PMKID capture via the WPA2-PSK path works normally. For FT-only APs, the captured PMKID is FT-derived — save it as PCAPNG and use FT-aware offline tools (e.g. hcxpcapngtool --enable_ft) for cracking.

Hidden Network Discovery

Probe Response frames triggered by deauth bursts automatically reveal hidden SSIDs. The engine caches these with zero configuration required.

PMF/WPA3 Detection

RSNE (Robust Security Network Element) parsing automatically identifies networks with PMF Required. These are skipped to save time, but WPA3 Transition Mode networks (PMF Capable but not Required) are still targeted.

ApRecord exposes pmf_capable and pmf_required so setTargetFilter callbacks can make finer-grained decisions than the binary skip_immune_networks config field — for example, to target only WPA3 Transition networks (PMF capable but not required).

Examples

The library includes complete examples demonstrating various use cases:

Example	Description
DeviceFingerprinting	Passive discovery of IoT and consumer electronics
TargetedAuditing	Network filtering with callbacks
EnterpriseAuditing	802.1X identity harvesting
StorageAndNVS	SD card PCAPNG logging and NVS persistence
WigleIntegration	GPS wardriving with Wigle CSV export
ExportFormats	PCAPNG capture and auxiliary HC22000 text export
DynamicControl	Runtime attack mode switching
AutoEnterpriseHunter	Automatic enterprise network targeting
SerialStreaming	Real-time packet streaming
StressTest	Performance and memory testing

See the examples/ directory for complete source code.

Documentation

Full API documentation is available in the docs/ directory. Generate fresh documentation:

doxygen Doxyfile

Then open docs/html/index.html in your browser.

Hardware Requirements

• Platform: ESP32, ESP32-S2, ESP32-S3, ESP32-C3 (ESP32-C6 pending Arduino framework support in PlatformIO)
• Framework: Arduino or ESP-IDF — both are supported natively via src/politician_compat.h. PoliticianStorage.h requires Arduino and will not compile under ESP-IDF.
• Memory: Minimum 4MB flash recommended
• Optional: SD card module for persistent logging
• Optional: GPS module for Wigle integration

Performance Considerations

• Channel Hopping: Default 200ms dwell time balances discovery speed vs. capture reliability
• Memory: Core engine uses ~45KB RAM. Storage helpers are opt-in
• CPU: Non-blocking state machine keeps loop() responsive
• Half-Handshakes: Enable for better capture rate on fast-hopping scenarios

Troubleshooting

No handshakes captured:

• Verify WiFi is enabled and promiscuous mode works
• Increase hop_dwell_ms for slow-reconnecting devices
• Check if target networks use PMF Required (will be auto-skipped)
• Try ATTACK_ALL mask for maximum aggression

SD card writes fail:

• Ensure SD.begin() succeeds before logging
• Check file permissions and available space
• Disable LOG_FILTER_BEACONS if using SPI SD cards

Enterprise identities not captured:

• Increase hop_dwell_ms to 800-1200ms for EAP exchanges
• Use ATTACK_PASSIVE or ATTACK_STIMULATE only
• Aggressive attacks may interrupt EAP authentication

Legal & Ethical Use

This library is intended for:

• ✅ Authorized penetration testing
• ✅ Security research in controlled environments
  
• ✅ Educational purposes with permission
• ✅ Auditing your own networks

Unauthorized access to networks you do not own or have permission to test is illegal under laws such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in the United States and similar legislation worldwide.

The authors and contributors assume no liability for misuse of this software.

Contributing

Contributions are welcome! Please:

1. Fork the repository
2. Create a feature branch
3. Add tests/examples for new features
4. Submit a pull request

License

MIT License - see [LICENSE](LICENSE) for details.

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to justcallmekoko for inspiring this project and the broader hardware hacking community through the ESP32 Marauder project. Years of learning from Marauder's innovative approaches to WiFi security research have been invaluable.